


COMMAND INFORMATION PACKAGE

Summer 1997

For Officers,
NCOs and
Junior Enlisted
Soldiers



Protecting the force is every leader's responsibility; we owe it to the sons and daughters of a grateful nation.

— Togo D. West Jr.

Secretary of the Army

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Managing Risk Is Every Leader's Job

Every day as we respond to the nation's needs, we expose our soldiers to hazards in uncertain and complex environments. We do this with the full knowledge that there are inherent risks associated with any military operation. The nature of our profession will not allow for either complacency or a cavalier acceptance of risk.



The purpose of risk management is to identify operational risks and take reasonable measures to reduce or eliminate hazards.... Risk management is not an add-on feature to the decision-making process, but rather a fully integrated element of planning and executing operations....

Our goal is to make risk management a routine part of planning and executing operational missions. Risk management helps us preserve combat power and retain the flexibility for bold and decisive action. Proper risk management is a force multiplier that we can ill afford to squander.

Ultimately, leaders will make decisions that place our soldiers in harm's way. That is inherent in the responsibility of command. We have tools to help you, and I expect you to use them — but they are tools at best, and no tool can substitute for the exercise of responsible judgment. I expect commanders to create an environment in which the lives and well-being of our soldiers are an integral part of the accomplishment of the mission. Our soldiers deserve no less.

— Gen. Dennis J. Reimer
Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

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Protect the Force Through Risk Management

The *Command Information Package*, published twice a year, is an Army information product that, in each issue, covers a single theme in depth. Its purpose is to guide and inform officers, NCOs, and junior enlisted soldiers on Army program developments that affect them. The package includes one *Soldiers' Scene* centerfold.

A contract printer distributes the *Command Information Package* in accordance with subscriptions entered on DA Form 12-99-R. (In filling out the form to subscribe or change your subscription, enter "04" as the form number and "0147" as the block number. Instructions for the use of DA 12-series forms and a reproducible copy of the forms are in DA Pamphlet 25-33.)

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Attention, CI Package Savers!
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"Tricare and More on Quality of Life"



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Make Safety Happen

The mission of our Army is to fight and win our nation's wars. Statistics from our past major conflicts reveal that we have two enemies on the battlefield: one is *them*, the other is *us*.

Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Konitzer
Director of Army Safety

In every modern war except the Korean War, the Army has lost more people and equipment to accidents than to enemy action. Accidental losses impose a drain on our combat capability that we simply cannot afford. We have got to deal with the *us* problems and reduce the hazards and risks to soldiers in order to preserve our warfighting abilities.

We recognize threats to our soldiers in combat. We deal with the enemy through our capabilities and the dynamics of combat power that we apply in the battlefield operating systems. Just as important is the integration of risk management into a closed-loop process starting with planning, continuing throughout execution and all the way through post-operations.

The traditional approach to safety is reactive. That is, we analyze statistics, gather information during accident investigations, and provide information to units to help them prevent future accidents from the same or similar causes. Over the years, an image of safety as an external, compliance-based force has evolved.

We must make the transition in safety to a proactive approach in which we truly internalize the risk-management process and integrate it into everything we do. When we make risk management an intuitive way of thinking and a way of life for every soldier and civilian, we can then look to a future in which making informed decisions to control hazards or accept risks is embedded in the Army's

culture. Leaders have a responsibility to inculcate into the hearts and minds of every soldier and civilian a personal responsibility to make safety happen. We are not there yet, but we are continuing to move in the right direction.

Individual responsibilities

There are some intangibles we don't usually regard as safety related, but I think they are. As a member of the total Army, even if you are not directly responsible for people or equipment, you are responsible for three things: your appearance, your performance, and your conduct. All three have safety implications.

• **Appearance.** Your appearance is not just how you look in a uniform or civilian clothes. It is your ability to maintain your readiness, both physical and mental — to perform your job.

The Army has fitness tests and other requirements to maintain and check soldiers' physical readiness. Mental readiness is what determines one's choice of fight or flight. The essence of mental readiness is an individual's beliefs, values, and attitude. This is the human dimension that causes people to behave in a disciplined, mature, and common-sense manner — or not. Soldiers, particularly those in the 18-to-25 age group (40 percent of our Army), tend to think they are invincible: "It will happen to anybody but me." My message to you is that you really need to understand the human dimensions and what you are physically capable of, realizing that we can't leap tall buildings in a single bound or step in front of locomotives....

• **Performance.** Proficiency in our technical and tactical skills is an individual responsibility. It is through knowing our strengths and weaknesses that we can best progress through the crawl-walk-run stages of performing tasks to safe standards. We sometimes lose sight of the axiom that "currency is not proficiency" and think that if we have done it once, we can do it again without preparation.

• **Conduct.** We are all responsible for our actions 24 hours a day, both on and off duty. Yet soldiers are falling short in fulfilling their responsibility to conduct safe operations. The leading cause of accidental death is attributed to failing to recognize hazards, underestimating personal risk, and overestimating personal ability. Every person is responsible for doing the right thing in the absence of leadership — to do what we are supposed to do without being told. Failure to conduct ourselves in a disciplined manner is irresponsible.

Know yourself. Know your own strengths and weaknesses and then be able to temper the warrior spirit with a commonsense approach to life. As a responsible individual, you are expected to apply judgment and sound decision making to whatever you do, integrating and applying risk management even at the lowest levels. The five steps of the risk-management process can and should be applied to everything we do.

Leader responsibilities

Warrior leaders motivate soldiers and bring out the warrior spirit. Warrior leaders, therefore, have a responsibility to make safety happen by setting the conditions for their soldiers to crawl, then walk, then run, based on capabilities; environment; the mission-essential task list; and the mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available. We have absolutely superb soldiers in the field, soldiers who will respond to great command leadership, but we have to make sure their "can do" is tempered with common sense and proper risk-management integration.

We've got to think with our head, and we've got to think with our gut. When thinking with our head, we see, we smell, we hear; we put brain power to work. But there is an intuitive factor as well. If something doesn't feel right, it probably isn't — and somebody ought to do something about it. Therefore, listen to your gut.

We want soldiers to be disciplined and respond to leadership. At the same time, we want soldiers to understand that accidents don't respect rank. Accidents can happen to anybody, including generals. Murphy lurks around every corner. Therefore, if a soldier of any rank sees an officer or NCO about to do something without having considered all the hazards and controls, we want and expect that soldier to step in, take action, and prevent an accident from happening.

My responsibilities to you

I owe you a vision, along with inputs and outputs. My vision or focus for the Army Safety Program is to mature what has been started: To take the risk-management process that is in the field, generally accepted yet not fully understood, and integrate it into our systems, organizations, and individual behavior.

We can no longer afford to regard safety as an afterthought. It must be a part of everything we do: warfighting, doctrine, training, leader development, materiel development, personnel assignments — everything.

My next responsibility to you is to listen to what you want from the Safety Center. By taking your accurate and timely inputs in the form of accident reports and analyzing them, we can best perform my other responsibility of providing you useful outputs in the form of products such as *Flightfax*; *Countermeasure*; leader's guides; and models for controlling hazards and risks.

We also need to do better in capturing the good-news stories and good ideas that are at work today, but we need your help. Please send us your safety ideas, close calls, and lessons learned.

My final commitment to you is to structure an Army Safety Center that is customer focused from its organizational structure to its automation interfaces. Like the rest of the Army, the Safety Center is seeking ways to become more efficient and relevant. We are going to bring about a total safety cultural change, but not all at once. We are going to

accomplish this goal by swallowing the elephant one toe at a time. We all have a responsibility, and together as a team, we will Make Safety Happen! **CIP**

Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Konitzer is the director of Army safety and the commander of the U.S. Army Safety Center. (The original version of this article first appeared in the November 1995 issue of Flightfax, published by the U.S. Army Safety Center, Fort Rucker, Ala.)

Marching Toward World-Class Safety

Our safety performance is something we can all be proud of. It is paying huge dividends in preserving the Army's warfighting capability. We have truly reached another milestone in our journey toward world-class performance. But we must not lose sight of one thing: any accidental loss of life is unacceptable.

We can't go on letting trucks roll over because drivers were poorly trained; we can't let paratroopers die because the unit didn't enforce the standards; we can't let soldiers be crushed by tank turrets or vehicles because communications broke down; we can't do any of the things that injure or kill our soldiers. Everyone is an important member of the team. Teammates don't let their buddies down. We can do better.

World-class performance in safety is not losing our nation's most precious resources — its sons and daughters — to an unplanned behavior or condition called an accident. World-class performance is achieved through a combination of proactive leadership, tasks performed to standard, teamwork, effective communications, and the process of identifying hazards and implementing controls called risk management.

We have found that risk assessment is pretty well understood in the field. People are identifying hazards and assessing risks. The trouble is, it often stops there. And when it does, that means no controls have been designed during the decision step to implement; therefore, no supervision takes place to ensure that the controls are used.

By firmly fixing risk management into all of the Army's processes — decision making, training management, force protection, personnel assignments, maintenance, etc. — we can stop killing soldiers and destroying equipment. It can be done, and we're going to do it. We just need to get on with it. We must get risk management standardized and institutionalized. Simply put, we've got to get into the head space of every leader, every soldier, every civilian, and every contractor — and make risk management an intuitive part of everything we do.

Safety is not just leaders' business. Everyone makes safety happen! We're moving ahead with efforts to standardize and institutionalize risk management — the key to future safety successes along our journey toward world-class safety performance. Join the march today! **CIP**

1996: Army's Safest Year Yet

"The Army put five new safety marks on the wall in fiscal year 1996, achieving record lows in most major accident categories."

That's the good news from Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Konitzer, director of Army safety and commander of the U.S. Army Safety Center at Fort Rucker, Ala.

Highlights of the Army's safety performance are as follows:

- The fiscal 1996 total accident rate of 4.22 accidents per 1,000 soldiers was significantly lower than the previous record-low rate of 4.98, set in fiscal 1995.
- The total civilian lost-time-claim rate dropped to a new low of 22.83 claims per 1,000 employees; the previous low was 23.29, in fiscal 1988.
- The fiscal 1996 Classes A through C ground-accident rate also continued downward, setting a record low of 4.02 accidents per 1,000 soldiers, compared to last year's all-time low of 4.79.
- The personnel-injury rate for Classes A through C accidents also dropped to a new low of 2.51 injuries per 1,000 soldiers, compared to the previous low of 3.05 in fiscal 1995.
- Army aviation set an all-time record low for the number and rate of Class A flight accidents. The Army experienced a total of seven Class A flight accidents, closing out fiscal 1996 with a Class A flight accident rate of 0.65 per 100,000 flight hours. The previous low of 0.83 was set in fiscal 1995. Konitzer attributes much of the success achieved in aviation safety to the fact that all aviation battalions and brigades have trained aviation safety officers who promote unit safety awareness and incorporate risk management into the mission-planning process.

Konitzer said the tremendous improvements in safety performance in the past few years have greatly enhanced the Army's warfighting capability.

Avoiding accidental losses of personnel and equipment, in both peace and war, can give commanders the additional edge they need to fight and win on the battlefield, he said.

"Directly responsible for the Army's safety successes," said Konitzer, "are proactive leadership, great teamwork, established standards for every task performed, information links, and the fact that a five-step, commonsense process called 'risk management' is starting to take effect.

"Learning to identify hazards, assess hazards, develop controls and make risk decisions, implement controls, and super-

vise and evaluate results is key to mitigating risks. The five-step risk-management process helps us do a better job of protecting the soldiers, civilians, and family members who comprise our total force. We're marching in the right direction by integrating risk management into all the Army does. This means making informed decisions to control hazards or accept risks. And once we get the risk-management process firmly fixed in the minds of all our soldiers and civilians and fully embedded into all the Army's systems, then the U.S. Army will truly be able to attain world-class safety performance." **CIP**

The POV Problem

Though fiscal year 1996 was a banner year for safety, one problem persisted: accidents involving privately owned vehicles — POVs. These accidents remain the number-one killer of soldiers. In fact, The Army's number-one soldier killer consistently has been the POV.

When you consider that soldiering, by its very nature, involves risk, you might suppose that training accidents or deployments into unfriendly areas pose the greatest threat to the lives of soldiers. They do not. The car by far — along with other POVs — poses the greatest threat.

Deaths in this category actually increased from 116 in fiscal 1995 to 130 in fiscal 1996. The number of soldiers lost in fiscal 1996 was about the number in an entire headquarters and headquarters company of an infantry battalion — losses the Army cannot afford.

The U.S. Army Safety Center — after analyzing driver-error POV accidents in which soldiers were killed — found the typical victim to be a male 19 to 25 years old, in the grade range of E3 to E5. Of all POV deaths, 68 percent met this profile, which describes only 40 percent of the soldier population. Causes of POV deaths included excessive speed, driving while fatigued, and failure to use seat belts. Many POV accidents were directly related to soldiers' inability to recognize hazards, underestimating their personal risk while overestimating their personal ability.

The Army Safety Center — with support from the Aviation Warfighting Center — has developed a new tool: the Automated Risk-Assessment and Control Program for POVs. Now available Army-wide, this program helps drivers become more aware of POV hazards, estimate their individual risk of having an accident, and choose controls that will lower their risk. Anyone can access the program at the following Internet web-site address: <http://rucker-usasc.army.mil>.

The automated program can help reduce POV accidents and save lives, but it is only a tool. The key to POV driving safety remains chain-of-command efforts to change soldiers' attitudes about POV hazards and instill in them the discipline to drive safely. **CIP**

NOTE: See the Soldiers' Scene centerfold insert on air-bag safety.

Standardizing Risk Management

Risk management in the Army is generally accepted but only somewhat understood. As an institution, we have the opportunity to capture the power of risk management by standardizing it and firmly fixing it as a guiding principle for all that we do.

Dennis Keplinger

This will be accomplished when we integrate the risk-management process into all Army processes and into individual behavior both on and off duty.

Risk management is a key component of force-protection doctrine and will be included in FM 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations*. It applies across the spectrum of Army operations, processes, and activities, including force development, force sustainment, force projection, and individual decision making.

Currently, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and the U.S. Army Safety Center are jointly developing FM 100-14, *Risk Management*. It will discuss the risk-management philosophy, process, terms, and responsibilities.

The philosophy

The Army's mission is to fight and win our nation's wars. For this mission, our country arms us with critical resources, including the most valuable of all: its sons and daughters. We use these resources to generate overwhelming combat power so that we can fight and win quickly, decisively, with minimum losses. Our inherent responsibility to the nation is to protect and preserve these resources so that they are ready when called upon.

Protecting the force is a responsibility that resides with all individuals at all levels of leadership. Current joint and Army

doctrine describes the four elements of combat power: leadership, maneuver, fire-power, and protection. Protection has four components: (1) operations security; (2) health, welfare, and maintenance; (3) safety; and (4) fratricide avoidance. Today's new world order demands full-time force protection planning that holistically and continuously considers all four components.

Risk management is an effective process for preserving our most valuable resources. It provides a systematic, logical thought process to identifying and controlling hazards that endanger our combat power. Risk management supports and encourages initiative, allowing flexibility, adaptability, and eagerness to act. In addition to safety, it applies to all that we do in all situations and environ-

ments, in developing (force design, manpower allocation, training development, combat development, etc.), fielding (materiel development, logistics, training base operations, etc.), and employing the force (force projection, anti-terrorism, deployment, force protection, operations, etc.).

Successful preservation of combat assets requires a cultural change. Key to this change is the integration of risk management into all Army processes; for example, the systems-acquisition process, the training-management process, and the collective and individual decision-making processes. Through integration, leaders and individuals are charged with the responsibility, authority, and accountability for risk-management decisions at the most appropriate level. This includes

Today's new world order demands full-time force protection planning that holistically and continuously considers all four components.

Standardizing Risk Management

equipment, and mission accomplishment. Stepping out of your lane to identify and take action on hazards to life, limb, equipment, and mission accomplishment.

The process

The risk-management process involves identifying and controlling hazards to protect the force. Its five steps represent a logical thought process from which users develop tactics, techniques, and procedures for applying risk management in their areas of responsibility. Following are the five steps:

- **Identify hazards to the force.**

Consider all aspects of current and future situations, the environment, and known historical problem areas.

- **Assess hazards to determine risks.**

Assess the impact of each hazard in terms of potential loss and cost, based on probability and severity.

- **Develop controls and make risk decisions** that eliminate the hazard or reduce its risk. As control measures are developed, reevaluate risk until it is reduced to the level at which benefits outweigh cost.

- Implement controls that eliminate the hazards or reduce their risks.

- **Supervise and evaluate.** Enforce standards and controls. Evaluate the effectiveness of controls and adjust or update as necessary.

The tools

The five steps of the risk-management process do not change, but risk-management tools are personalized for organizations and individuals. They are tailored to the unique requirements of each leadership level, situation, mission, and environment. Individuals use these tools to assist them in applying the five steps of

the risk-management process. Examples of tools for individual, organizational, and systems processes include —

- Next Accident Assessment for Leaders and Individuals (found in *Leader's Guide to Force Protection*, U.S. Army Safety Center).

- Individual Hazard Assessment Matrix (found in *FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations*).

- Automated Risk Assessment and Controls Programs (Rotary-Wing and POV), U.S. Army Safety Center.

- Risk management training support packages (found in *Soldiers and Leaders*, U.S. Army Safety Center).

CIP

Dennis Keplinger, with the Training Division of the Safety Center, wrote the original version of this article in July 1996. Maj. John R. Hefner, with the Force Development Division of the center, updated the article for this Command Information Package.

Terms

Condition. The readiness status of personnel and equipment as they interact with the operational environment during mission planning and execution.

Control. Action taken to eliminate hazards or reduce their risk.

Exposure. The frequency and length of time subjected to a hazard.

Hazard. Any real or potential condition that can cause injury, illness, death of personnel, damage to or loss of equipment or property, or mission degradation.

Probability. The likelihood that an event will occur.

Risk. Chance of hazard or bad consequences; exposure to chance of injury or loss. Risk level is expressed in terms of hazard probability and severity.

Risk assessment. The identification and assessment of hazards (first two steps of the risk-management process).

Risk decision. The decision to accept or reject the risk associated with an action.

Risk management integration. The process by which individuals or organizations develop plans to embed risk management in all they do. The five steps of the risk-management integration process are as follows:

- (1) identify risk-management-integration opportunities,
- (2) assess improvement opportunities,
- (3) develop integration procedures,
- (4) assist implementation of integration procedures, and
- (5) measure and reassess the degree of integration and its results.

Severity. The expected consequence of an event in terms of degree of injury, property damage, or other mission impairment (such as loss of combat power or adverse publicity).

CIP

Soldiers' Scene

Command Information for Soldiers

Summer 1997



Air bags save lives, almost 500 in 1995 alone. However, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration reports that at least 35 children and several adults have been killed by deploying air bags.

In many cases, the children killed by an air bag, riding in the front seat, were either out of position (unbuckled or not wearing the shoulder portion of the safety belt) or sitting in a rear-facing child-safety seat.

Air bags work best when everyone is buckled up and children are in the back seat. Follow these safety rules:

- Always have children up to 12 years old ride in the back seat, and make sure they are buckled up.
- Secure babies less than a year old, or weighing less than 20 pounds, in rear-facing child-safety seats, properly installed in the back seat of the car.
- Secure children weighing 20 to 40 pounds in convertible car seats facing forward, properly installed in the back seat of the car.
- Secure children weighing 40 pounds or more in booster seats, properly installed in the back seat of the car.

Children up to 12 years old should always ride in the back seat. Allow older children to ride in the front seat only if the following conditions are met:

- (1) The child wears both the lap and shoulder belts.
- (2) The shoulder strap fits correctly over the collarbone. Never place it behind the back.
- (3) The lap belt fits low on the hips.
- (4) The child is instructed to sit back, buckled up in the seat.
- (5) The front passenger seat is pushed as far back as possible.

Source: Air Bag Safety Campaign, Suite 401, 1019 19th Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20036-5105 • Information Hotline: (202) 625-2570

Soldiers' Scene is a bulletin board product for junior enlisted soldiers. It informs soldiers about Army programs, careers, pay and benefits, quality of life, and modernization. It is part of the Command Information Package.

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The Challenge of Change

Change. The Army's gone through a lot of it in the past five years. We've become a new force, a smaller force, a force that not only defends the nation militarily but also takes on new, nontraditional missions.

Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Konitzer

And much of the time, we conduct operations as part of a joint and combined force. From being a forward-deployed, forward-defense, major-land-war Army, we've become a contingency-force-oriented, crisis-response Army, based in the continental United States, that must prepare to react to uncertain threats.

All this is now reality. It's not just coming, it's here. The radical changes we're dealing with as well as those we have yet to face require corresponding changes in the way we look at doing our business. Why? Because one thing has not changed: accidents are still a major threat. And, as the Army has shrunk in size even as our missions have grown, every accident has become more expensive — not only in terms of manpower and money, but also in terms of readiness.

Today, more than ever before, every mission requires precise planning, precise execution, and precise evaluation. Risk management integration into all three is the key to protecting the force.

We have a simple risk-management process that we can apply to everything we do. All we have to do when we receive a mission is work the hazards and controls in the five-step process:

- Step 1. Identify hazards.
- Step 2. Assess hazards.
- Step 3. Develop controls and make risk decisions.
- Step 4. Implement controls.
- Step 5. Supervise and evaluate.

Simple, right? So how come we're not all doing it? It has to do with our culture.

Our cultural dilemma

Some aspects of Army culture work against the risk-management process. After all, risk management leaves no place for —

- The "Hooah Factor," the "We can do any thing, any where, any time, at any cost" attitude that's so much a part of our Army culture.
- The need to "do more with less" mindset.
- Our inbred reluctance to say "No."
- Making decisions based on "the way we've always done it."
- Letting "somebody else" worry about the hazards involved in our missions.
- Doing only what we have to do and not giving a thought to what we ought to do — such as wearing flak jackets in all live-fire training even when it's not required by regulation. In other words, doing the harder right versus the easier wrong.

The solution to this cultural dilemma

seems to be pretty straightforward: Change the culture. Can we do it? Absolutely we can. And it doesn't have to take forever. We've made some huge changes in our culture during the relatively recent past. We've seen —

- Yesterday's macho image of the hard-drinkin', hell-raisin' soldier replaced by today's image of the responsible, self-disciplined soldier.

• Yesterday's attitude that accidents are simply the cost of doing the Army's business replaced by today's attitude that accidents are neither necessary nor acceptable.

• Yesterday's attitude that high risk is inherent in hard, tough, realistic training replaced by today's attitude that risk management enables us to train hard

• Yesterday's acceptance — even celebration — of a Class A accident rate of 5, 8, and even 10 accidents per 100,000 flying hours replaced by today's attitude that a rate of less than 1 is still too high.

So, no, cultural change is not impossible. But it's not going to be easy — for a number of reasons.

And there are soldiers of all ranks who don't have it in them to tell the boss something he or she doesn't want to hear.

The Challenge of Change

Certain of today's realities stand in the way of our easily changing the way we do business. For example —

- Smaller Army with more missions. Doing more and more with less and less results in little or no time to learn the lessons of the last mission or to adequately prepare for the next. Leaders and their staffs are so busy that they are off planning the next mission while the troops are executing the current one. There's so much to do, we stay with what we know — "the way we've always done it."

- Personalities. We have leaders at all levels whose style it is to say, "I don't want to hear excuses; if you can't do the job, I'll find somebody who can." And there are soldiers of all ranks who simply don't have it in them to tell the boss something he or she doesn't want to hear. And so we are encouraged to stay with what we know — "the way we've always done it."

- Competition. It's a hard thing to point out a problem — especially when nobody else is complaining. Doing so could be perceived as whining and give our peers an edge over us. So we go along, staying with what we know — "the way we've always done it."

- Career aspirations. Today's Army consists of quality competing with quality. May heaven forbid that leaders become more concerned about their careers than about their troops, but the opportunity exists. We all have career aspirations and, therefore, walk a cautious line. As a result, we tend to stay with what we know — "the way we've always done it."

The Army has experienced significant change, creating a cultural dilemma we must overcome.

How do we do it?

Leaders at all levels are responsible to protect the force. They are required to make unencumbered, conscious (rather than unconscious) decisions to either eliminate hazards or accept risks. The mindsets previously discussed are the

encumbrances to clear decision making. A standard process linked to proactive leadership can be the effective means to overcome our cultural dilemma. Risk management is that process.

When it comes to payoff versus effort, consistent use of the five-step risk-management process offers an unparalleled win-win opportunity — a way to get any job done with a clear focus on hazards and controls to mitigate risks. The risk-management process gives us a standard procedure, regardless of mission or force mix or location, to deal with today's realities of uncertainty and high operational tempo, which demand that —

- We know and perform to established standards — every time, in every thing. Using our standard five-step risk-management process is a credible way to challenge and eliminate the "That's the way we do it in this unit" mentality and get back to doing things right — to Army standards.

- We make effective communication the norm up and down the chain of command. A byproduct of the risk-management process will be improved communication as we make it not only acceptable but expected for everyone involved at every level to articulate to the boss the hazards, controls, and resources required to mitigate the risk of every mission. Risk management becomes the standard way of doing business. It is linking a process with leadership; that's capturing the power of risk management. Consider how it is in the crew compartment or cockpit, where we stress crew coordination and communication. Every crew member is expected to speak up, which eliminates many of the inhibitors to effective communications — rank, age, experience, job, and so forth. Combining this idea with the risk-management process outside the crew station would improve communications throughout the chain of command.

- We make good decisions based on facts, not on fear of being perceived as weak or negative. If we all speak the same language and work the same process of

same language and work the same process of risk management, everybody will understand and no one will mistake the articulation of hazards ("Here's the level of risk for this mission, Boss, and I need your help to bring it down to an acceptable level and still accomplish the mission without any loss") for making excuses ("What's the matter? You can't do it?").

- We make it not just acceptable, but mandatory, to tell the boss "No, we can't do that" when risks are too high. If we work the five-step risk-management process at every level, the yes will come — but only after the risks have been controlled to an acceptable level or someone with the proper authority at the proper level makes a conscious, fully informed decision to accept that risk.

- We once and for all destroy the notion that we'll do things differently when the shooting starts, that we'll abandon standards and all that other "training stuff." Risk management is not only an enabler to realistic training, its across-the-board, methodical use will be the best method we have of making sure the only threat we face in combat is the enemy.

Where do we start?

We start by making risk management — identifying hazards, putting controls in place — the standard way we do business in the Army. So, how do we do that?

We base it on doctrine. Doctrine is the engine of change in the Army; it drives change not only in training, equipment, and organization, but also to a large extent in Army culture — those attitudes and thought processes that make the Army what it is.

This being the case, the catalyst for embedding risk management in our culture is already in our doctrine. FM 100-5, *Operations*, our keystone warfighting text, was significantly updated in 1993 to stress the principles we need to learn and understand to maintain the edge in future theaters of war. A key update was the addition of safety as a component of the

protection element of combat power. Safety has also been included in joint-operations doctrine since 1995 (Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*). That doctrine specifies that protection of the force through the integration of safety into all aspects of planning and execution is crucial to successful operations.

Just as doctrine and policy changes are capturing the top-down approach to risk management integration, so too the Training and Doctrine Command is working the bottom-up approach through the integration of risk management into officer, NCO, and civilian leader-development schools. All that's left is for the field to shoot to the middle and just do it, just integrate risk management into all that we do.

The Army has done remarkably well in reducing accidents, thus saving lives — especially in the past few years — even as global responsibilities have increased. A combination of factors has had a direct impact on this success. First and foremost is the proactive leadership exhibited at all levels. Second is the fact that we have clear and achievable standards for every individual and collective task soldiers are required to perform. Third is teamwork. It is the essence of how we do business. The fourth is the information flow to enhance communications between decision makers. These four elements are institutionalized throughout our Army today. The fifth ingredient that needs to be institutionalized is a process — the risk management

process. Once embedded as a systems approach to business, we can consistently achieve world-class performance.

We must embrace risk management as a sound investment in readiness, not as just another "safety requirement" that has nothing to do with our real mission. The true cost of our failure to protect the force through risk management will be paid out of lives and equipment — and thus out of readiness.

And that's a price we simply cannot afford to pay. **CIP**

This article first appeared in the October 1996 issue of Flightfax.

Making Change "Stick"

Risk management is not rocket science. Leadership at the appropriate level of authority sets the standard for risk management, making informed decisions to control hazards and manage or accept risks. Every soldier and civilian is responsible and accountable for protecting the force through risk management.

To ensure the safety of its total force of soldiers, civilians, and family members, the Army has selected risk management as its principal risk-reduction process. The five steps of the risk-management process do not change. The process applies —

- During all missions, wartime and operations other than war.
- In all environments, tactical and administrative.
- In all operations, training and garrison.
- For all components of the force, active, reserve, civilian, family member, and industrial support.
- At all times, on and off duty.

The requirement is for soldiers, civilians, leaders, and managers to make a conscious decision to control hazards and manage or accept risks. Hazards must be identified and assessed, and control measures must be selected to reduce risk to an acceptable level. The degree of risk determines the level of decision authority to accept it. When you do not have the resources to control a high risk, you should elevate the decision authority to the next higher command. This process continues until the information is presented to the level of command that can eliminate the hazard or control it to an acceptable level. In this manner, a conscious and informed decision is made to commit the resources to control the hazard or accept the risk.

Feedback from the field indicates that commanders and soldiers generally accept, but only somewhat understand, the risk-management process. As evidenced by our continuing improvements in safety, we are already seeing "islands of excellence" in which soldiers are learning to manage risks effectively. But to turn the corner and capture the full power of risk management, we must overcome what I call our cultural dilemma: the reluctance to say "no," the "do more with less" mindset, and the "hooah" factor: "We can do any thing, any time, any place." We must change our Army's culture.

How Well Do You Manage Risk?

Taking a closer look at your unit's risk-management program could help you spot faulty procedures and greatly reduce your costs.

Maj. Frederick O. Stepak

As military organizations grow more and more austere, leaders must continually seek new methods to use shrinking resources wisely rather than reduce the number of personnel or the quality and quantity of training and equipment.

Although some reductions are inevitable, implementing more effective operational methods and procedures can achieve cost savings and keep reductions to a minimum. One method is to ensure your unit's risk-management program is functioning effectively and efficiently. If it isn't, you're missing out. Risk management enables units to economize on resources by preserving personnel and equipment.

Failure to control high-risk activities can seriously degrade a unit's combat capability and ultimately destroy any organization. Commanders must develop and tailor their risk-management pro-

gram to the unique aspects of unit mission and capabilities. In so doing, they must also seek a delicate balance between safety and realism in training. (For those in aviation, the new TC 1-210, *Aircrew Training Program: Commander's Guide to Individual and Crew Standardization*, helps the commander formulate and execute a risk-management program.)

The survey

As the commander of an aeromedical evacuation company in the Georgia Army National Guard, I face the challenges typical of other reserve-component organizations that seldom meet collectively to perform their mission. During a recent unit deployment in which crew endurance was stretched, the need to review the unit's risk-management program became evident.

To get a clear, accurate picture of our risk-management program, we had to measure characteristics, understanding and performance from a broad cross-section of the aviators themselves. I used an aviation risk-management questionnaire to obtain data for analysis.

The questionnaire was divided into three sections. The first section contained a series of comprehensive questions on demographics to describe the population.

The second section examined the respondents' risk-management training and experience level. The final section dealt with the respondents' perceptions, attitudes, and opinions about risk management.

Field testing of the survey proved invaluable. As a result of the field test, I either modified or discarded several poorly worded questions, changed the instructions, and added more fixed-choice items.

In a National Guard unit, the greatest number of members gathers during monthly multiple-unit training assemblies, so we chose such assemblies to administer our survey. We announced the date, time, and location a month in advance, and published a reminder in the monthly drill letter. The goal was to survey 100 percent of the warrant officer and commissioned officer aviators; however, as it turned out, only 75 percent of the target population was available during the scheduled two-day survey period.

I administered the survey by distributing numbered questionnaires and explaining the instructions, emphasizing anonymity and the need to accurately respond to all items. The location I used also served as the pilots' briefing room. Attendance at pilot briefings is mandatory. Thus, by administering the survey right after the morning pilot briefing, I captured a maximum number of participants.

The results

Careful analysis of data from the survey disclosed that our risk-management program needed improvement. Aviators believed they properly used risk-management procedures, and most believed that all or most identified risks were reduced or controlled through their efforts. All of the respondents said they used the risk-assessment matrix as the primary tool to accomplish risk management. Analysis clearly showed, however, that several aviators, when using a risk matrix, had difficulty distinguishing between risk management and risk assessment.

Failure to control high-risk activities can seriously degrade a unit's combat capability and ultimately destroy any organization.

They held the misconception that the matrix is the program.

Therein lay the problem. Our aviators had been doing what they had been taught — how to fill out the risk matrix — but they did not follow up by developing controls, making a risk decision, and implementing controls to eliminate or reduce the risks they had assessed. In analyzing the causes of accidents, failure to follow up risk assessment with risk management frequently emerges as a significant factor.

Why do we stop short in completing the risk-management process? Can our soldiers, subordinate leaders, and commanders accurately target and apply the entire process correctly? I discovered that in my unit we were thoroughly identifying risks, but we did not always take actions to effectively reduce or control them.

The survey became the catalyst for an extraordinary bottom-up approach to re-educating our unit aviators through both formal and on-the-job training. We appointed a risk-management officer to be responsible for training and maintaining aviator risk-management skills. Finally, we discovered that the risk-assessment form was repetitious and ambiguous, and no longer accurately assessed our degree of risk prior to flight. We modified the form to better determine risk.

How well does your program work?

You can find out how well your program works. There is nothing magical or complicated about developing or administering a survey. With a little effort, some planning and coordination, you might also be able to improve your safety program.

There's a healthy byproduct: discussion among unit members that may be even more valuable than the actual survey results. Regardless of the method, a survey can successfully assist the command in adjusting training to compensate for unit deficiencies, help in re-engineering

the unit risk-management program, and ultimately enable the command to conduct its mission more safely and confidently.

As commanders, we must ensure that everyone is trained in risk management, then strictly enforce the use of the entire risk-management process within our units. 

Maj. Frederick O. Stepat commanded the 151st Medical Company, High Capacity Air Ambulance (Provisional), Georgia Army National Guard. This article first appeared in the December 1995 issue of FlightFax, published by the U.S. Army Safety Center, Fort Rucker, Ala.

I discovered that in my unit we were thoroughly identifying risks, but we did not always take actions to effectively reduce or control them.

Live Fire; Deadly Fire

Training with deadly force is inherently risky. Our goal is to apply that deadly force to the enemy, not to ourselves.

Maj. Harold Barrentine

In October 1994, a soldier was shot and killed during a night live-fire exercise. Eight months later at two separate Army installations, a battalion commander was killed and a rifleman was seriously wounded in accidental shootings during night live-fire exercises. A month later, a soldier was killed by a fragmentation grenade during a day live-fire exercise. Two months after that, during a night live-fire exercise, another fragmentation grenade injured three soldiers. Less than 2 months later, a soldier was seriously injured by a fragmentation grenade during a day live-fire exercise.

All six of these accidents occurred during scheduled training on ranges designed specifically to accommodate the missions being performed. In all six cases, the same mission-essential task was being performed: clearing a trench line and knocking out a bunker. These six accidents also had in common one or more of the following causes:

Inadequate planning

- Fields of fire were not planned, confirmed, or controlled.
- Planned firing positions didn't give soldiers good observation points for intended targets.
- Planned tactics, techniques, and procedures were not in accordance with Army standards.

Also in all of these cases, rehearsals were inadequate:

- Leaders were permitted to continue training, even though they missed the tactical portion of the exercise without troops.
- There was no walk-through or blank fire before the live-fire exercise.
- The live-fire exercise was rehearsed

during the day on scale models instead of actual terrain.

- The live-fire exercise was not executed as rehearsed. Key personnel moved to unrehearsed positions just before the live fire started.

Failure to consider environment and visibility

- Terrain and environment were not considered during rehearsals.
- Night-vision devices were not used properly, because no Army standard exists for most of them used in ground operations.
- Soldiers didn't know how to use or focus night-vision devices, and they didn't know how to maintain them.

Failure to perform to standard

- Leaders didn't check observation and fields of fire from the firers' perspective. The battlefield appears much different from six inches above the ground than it does from five feet above.
- Units weren't trained in accordance with tactics and procedures established by

battle drills, training circulars, field manuals, and the mission training plan.

These six accidents had one more factor in common: They were avoidable. A simple five-step risk-management process used during by-the-book planning — followed by meticulous execution — could have prevented them.

The Army way is to train as you will fight. That means training to established standards and using the five-step risk-management process. After identifying and assessing hazards, leaders must decide what risks are acceptable, and develop controls to reduce risk as much as possible, implement those controls, and then supervise the operation. Leaders who complete the risk-management process are much more likely to complete their missions — with all their soldiers and gear intact — ready to fight another day. **CIP**

Maj. Harold Barrentine is an investigator assigned to the U.S. Army Safety Center, Fort Rucker, Ala. This article first appeared in the March 1996 issue of Countermeasure, a publication of the center.

Live Fire by the Book

There's no shortage of Army guidance for live-fire training. Try these:

KNOCK OUT BUNKER; CLEAR TRENCH LINE

- ARTEP 7-8, *Mission Training Plan for the Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad* (tasks 7-3/1114 (clear trench line) and 7-3/4-1113 (knock out bunker))
- FM 7-7J, *Mechanized Infantry Platoon and Squad (Bradley)*
- FM 7-8, *Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad* (battle drills 5 (knock out bunker) and 7 (enter and clear a trench))
- FM 7-10, *The Infantry Rifle Company*
- TC 7-9, *Infantry Live-Fire Training*

ENTER BUILDING; CLEAR ROOM

- FM 7-8, *Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad*, battle drill 6 (enter building/clear room)
- FM 90-10-1, *An Infantryman's Guide to Combat in Built-Up Areas*
- TC 7-9, *Infantry Live-Fire Training*
- TC 7-10, *Infantry Rifle Company*
- TC 90-1, *Training for Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain*

I Challenge You

Every soldier and civilian is responsible and accountable for identifying and assessing hazards and developing controls to reduce risks. If you have enough resources to control the risks to an acceptable level, accept the risk and move out. If you don't have the resources to do the job, pass the risk to the next level of leadership for resourcing or acceptance of the risk.



Getting the risk-management process firmly fixed in the minds of all our soldiers and civilians and fully embedded into all the Army's systems will help us avoid costly accidents. The Army is working this goal from three directions. From a top-down approach, the Army's senior leadership is integrating risk management into doctrine and policy changes. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command is working the bottom-up approach by integrating risk management training into officer, NCO, and civilian leader development courses. In a shoot-to-the-middle approach, everybody — commanders, soldiers, and civilians — at every level must accept responsibility for actively seeking opportunities to integrate risk management into all they do.

The cultural change needed to institutionalize risk management into Army systems, organizations, and individual behavior will not happen overnight. But we are marching in the right direction to fully integrate risk management and be able to attain world-class safety performance. We can do it. We must do it. The Army's future readiness depends on our ability to control accidental losses and preserve combat power.

I challenge each of you, regardless of your leadership level, to accept responsibility for safety and fully embrace risk management as a sound investment in our Army's readiness. We can make safety happen during every task, during every mission, 24 hours a day. Risk management is the key to our future successes.

— Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Konitzer
Director of Army Safety

As we become smaller, protecting the force becomes even more important. Risk management has resulted in a dramatic reduction of injuries and fatalities.

Gen. Dennis J. Reimer
Chief of Staff, U.S. Army